trinamiX asserts seven face-authentication patents against Apple, BMW seeks a declaration of non-infringement against Broadcom, and the Federal Circuit reverses the dismissal of an exclusive licensee's suit.

trinamiX Sensing LLC — pleaded as a Delaware limited liability company registered to transact business in Texas, with its principal place of business at 7800 Shoal Creek Boulevard, Suite 200N, Austin, Texas 78757, and a wholly owned subsidiary of trinamiX GmbH; and trinamiX GmbH — pleaded as a limited liability company organized under the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany, with its principal place of business at Industriestraße 35, 67063 Ludwigshafen am Rhein, Germany, a wholly owned subsidiary of BASF SE, and the owner by assignment of the Asserted Patents

Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP — Todd Briggs (signed; Redwood Shores, CA), Kevin P.B. Johnson (Redwood Shores, CA), Nathan Sun (San Francisco, CA; pro hac vice pending at filing), Nima Hefazi (Los Angeles, CA; pro hac vice pending at filing). No local counsel appears in the signature block. The docket also shows pro hac vice motions filed September 10, 2026 for Luiz Miranda and Christopher Sabbagh (and for Sun and Hefazi), granted by text orders on September 11, 2026.

trinamiX Sensing LLC and trinamiX GmbH filed suit against Apple Inc. in the Midland/Odessa Division of the Western District of Texas on September 3, 2026, asserting seven U.S. patents. The complaint pleads that trinamiX GmbH owns the Asserted Patents by assignment, that trinamiX GmbH is a wholly owned subsidiary of BASF SE, and that trinamiX Sensing LLC is a wholly owned subsidiary of trinamiX GmbH. It pleads that trinamiX originated from research at BASF beginning in or around 2010, when BASF scientists working on organic solar cells identified a material effect with sensing and three-dimensional measurement applications; that trinamiX GmbH was formed on December 16, 2014 and commenced operations in 2015 as a BASF spin-off; that it holds more than 800 granted or pending patents worldwide; that its scientists developed a beam profile analysis technique in 2016 and 2017; and that, as of August 2026, trinamiX Sensing LLC’s Austin team comprised twelve full-time-equivalent employees working on face authentication products that embody the Asserted Patents. The ’760, ’334, ’421 and ’925 patents (“Optical skin detection for face unlock”) form a continuation chain from Application No. 18/264,326, the U.S. national phase of PCT/EP22/053941, claiming priority to EP 21157800.0 filed February 18, 2021; the ’394, ’352 and ’238 patents (“Detector for identifying at least one material property”) are continuations of Application No. 17/439,492 (issued as U.S. Patent No. 11,947,013), the national phase of PCT/EP2020/056759, claiming priority to EP 19163250.4 filed March 15, 2019. The complaint describes the technology as face authentication that captures a 2D image and 3D depth information and classifies whether the presented material is real skin, to resist spoofing with masks, sculptures or printouts. It alleges that Apple released Face ID on or around November 3, 2017 with the iPhone X and added it to the iPad the following year; that, on information and belief, the original Face ID did not incorporate trinamiX’s patented technology and lacked material and skin detection, citing November 13, 2017 Mashable and Vice articles reporting that researchers at Bkav defeated iPhone X Face ID with a constructed mask; and that, on information and belief, Apple later incorporated trinamiX’s face authentication technologies into the Accused Products. No pre-suit notice letter, licensing discussion or other dated pre-suit contact between the parties is pleaded; the complaint pleads knowledge from at least the filing of the complaint and, on information and belief, that Apple was aware of trinamiX and its face authentication technologies and knew they were patented.

iPhone 15, iPhone 15 Plus, iPhone 15 Pro, iPhone 15 Pro Max, iPhone 16, iPhone 16e, iPhone 16 Pro, iPhone 16 Pro Max, iPhone 16 Plus, iPhone 17, iPhone 17e, iPhone 17 Pro, iPhone 17 Pro Max, iPhone Air, 11-inch iPad Pro (4th Generation), iPad Pro 12.9-inch (6th Generation), iPad Pro 11-inch (M4 and M5), iPad Pro 13-inch (M4 and M5), “and other infringing iPhone and iPad models” — pleaded as devices incorporating face authentication (Face ID), 3D-sensing and material detection capabilities (¶27). The iPhone 17 is the exemplar charted for claim 1 of each patent in Exhibits 11–17 (charts not read). Exhibit 19 is described on the docket as a “Technical Expert Report re iPhone 17 Testing” (not available in RECAP).

Seven counts of patent infringement, one per Asserted Patent. Direct infringement of at least claim 1 of each patent, literally and/or under the doctrine of equivalents, pleaded in substance under §271(a) (making, using, selling, offering for sale and/or importing the Accused Products); the complaint cites “35 U.S.C. § 271” only generally (¶12), without a subsection. Induced infringement pleaded in substance (§271(b) not cited by subsection): Apple allegedly encourages and instructs distributors, customers and end users, including through publicly available datasheets and manuals (Exhibit 18), with knowledge and specific intent. No contributory infringement is pleaded. Knowledge: actual knowledge “based on at least the filing of this Complaint”; alternatively, willful blindness before filing; and, on information and belief, awareness of trinamiX and its technologies and knowledge that they were patented. No count or prayer expressly alleges willful infringement or seeks enhanced damages. No §287 marking allegation is made. Each count alleges irreparable injury and that the case is exceptional under §285.

Plaintiff seeks judgment that Apple has infringed the Asserted Patents, directly and indirectly, literally or under the doctrine of equivalents; an injunction under 35 U.S.C. § 283 barring Apple and its affiliates, employees, agents, officers, directors, attorneys, successors, assigns and those in active concert from (1) infringing the Asserted Patents and (2) making, using, selling, offering for sale and importing the Accused Products; damages sufficient to compensate under 35 U.S.C. § 284; an exceptional-case finding and attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285; costs and expenses; prejudgment and post-judgment interest; and further relief. No enhanced damages or accounting is requested. Plaintiffs demand a jury trial on any issues so triable (Fed. R. Civ. P. 38).

Subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338(a). Venue is pleaded under both 28 U.S.C. § 1391 and § 1400(b). Pleaded venue facts: Apple has committed acts of infringement in the District and maintains regular and established places of business at 12535 Riata Vista Circle and 6900 West Parmer Lane, Austin, Texas; sells the Accused Products in the District, including at physical Apple stores; employs over 5,000 people across several Austin campuses, described as its largest corporate hub outside Cupertino; and, on information and belief, Face ID components (VCSELs and image sensors) are manufactured by or in partnership with companies in Texas and/or the District. Personal jurisdiction rests on acts of infringement in the District and the same places of business.

Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft (BMW AG) — pleaded as a company organized and existing under the laws of Germany with its principal place of business at Petuelring 130, 80809 Munich, Germany

Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP — Lionel M. Lavenue (signed; Reston, VA), Timothy J. May (Washington, DC; admission to be filed), Matthew C. Berntsen and Guanshi Li (Boston, MA). No local counsel appears in the signature block.

BMW AG filed this declaratory judgment action in the Marshall Division of the Eastern District of Texas on August 31, 2026 against Broadcom Inc. and Avago Technologies International Sales Pte. Limited, seeking declarations of non-infringement of three U.S. patents of which Avago is pleaded to be the record owner. The complaint pleads, on information and belief, that Avago acquired Broadcom Corporation in 2015 and formed Broadcom Limited, which became Broadcom Inc. in 2018, and that Avago is a wholly owned subsidiary of Broadcom Inc. It pleads that in October 2020 BMW AG entered into a patent license agreement with Avago that listed Avago as grantor, defined Broadcom Inc. as an “AFFILIATE”, and covered Broadcom’s global patent portfolio including U.S. patents; that agreement has expired. The complaint alleges that since 2025 Broadcom has sought a renewed global license at royalty rates it describes as a multiple-fold increase over the 2020 agreement: in July 2025 Broadcom wrote to BMW AG about the 2020 agreement; in October 2025 it sent a presentation titled “Broadcom Patent Licensing Proposal” and terms for a “worldwide patent license”; BMW AG made a counteroffer that Broadcom did not accept; and in January 2026 Broadcom sent a list of patents it identified as relevant, with its analysis “ongoing”, labelling the ’778 patent an “Exemplary Patent”. It alleges that Broadcom accused BMW AG vehicles of infringing patents directed to automotive Ethernet and Wi-Fi (e.g., Wi-Fi 5 and Wi-Fi 6), and in March and June 2026 sent at least six “infringement presentations”, each for a patent family including at least one U.S. patent. As pleaded: in March 2026 Broadcom sent a presentation for a counterpart of the ’389 patent that also listed the ’389 patent, and in June 2026 Avago sued BMW AG in Munich on the European counterpart (Landgericht München I, Docket No. 7 O 5786/26); in March 2026 Broadcom sent a presentation for the ’778 patent itself; and in June 2026 Broadcom sent a presentation for a counterpart of the ’672 patent that listed the ’672 patent, and in August 2026 Avago sued BMW AG and its affiliate BMW M GmbH on the European counterpart (Landgericht München I, Docket No. 21 O 7936/26). The complaint also alleges that Avago threatened BMW AG with more lawsuits. The patents cover an extended-range Ethernet line code using 4B/3B mapping (’389), 10GBASE-T start-up using PMA training frames (’778), and 20 MHz/40 MHz overlapping-BSS coexistence in wireless LANs (’672).

As pleaded, Defendants contend that: (’389 patent) BMW AG vehicles implementing the 100BASE-T1 standard, such as the BMW 3 Series G20, BMW M3 Type G80, MINI Countryman Type U25, 2025 BMW 1 Series F70, 2025 BMW 4 Series, 2025 BMW 3 Series and 2025 BMW X3, infringe at least claim 1; (’778 patent) BMW AG vehicles implementing 1000Base-T1 automotive Ethernet links, such as the same seven models, infringe at least claim 1; (’672 patent) BMW AG vehicles implementing a Wi-Fi standard, such as the BMW 5 Series, infringe at least claim 1. Generally, the complaint says Broadcom’s accusations concern automotive Ethernet and Wi-Fi technologies (e.g., Wi-Fi 5 and Wi-Fi 6) used in BMW AG vehicles.

Three counts, each for a declaratory judgment of non-infringement under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq. and Fed. R. Civ. P. 57 (Count I ’389; Count II ’778; Count III ’672). Each count pleads that BMW AG has not infringed, directly or indirectly, literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, at least claim 1 (quoted in full), under any act set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 271, and does not infringe any other claim for the same or substantially similar reasons, and that Defendants have identified no other infringing use. Limitations pleaded as not met: (’389) mapping 3-bit binary IDLE patterns to IDLE portions of the ternary bit streams according to the least-significant-bit rule; (’778) exchanging PMA training frames periodically during a training period, with a majority portion of each frame comprising pseudo random known sequences; (’672) reconfiguring the receiving device to restrict RF channel bandwidth based on the absence of capabilities information in a received frame. For each, the complaint alleges that implementing the relevant standard does not require the claimed step and that the portions of the standard Broadcom relied on do not disclose the claimed limitations. For the ’389 and ’672 patents it pleads that claim 1 has the same limitations as claim 1 of the European counterpart asserted in Munich. No declaration of invalidity, unenforceability, license, patent exhaustion or FRAND obligation, and no breach-of-contract claim, is pleaded; the expired 2020 license is pleaded only as background and as a personal-jurisdiction contact.

Plaintiff seeks a declaration that BMW AG, its vehicles and components thereof, and its customers, importers and suppliers do not infringe and have not infringed, under any theory (direct, individually or jointly, or indirect, contributorily or by inducement), any enforceable claim of the patents-in-suit; judgment in BMW AG’s favor on its claims; a permanent injunction restraining Defendants and those acting in concert with them from asserting the patents-in-suit under any subsection of 35 U.S.C. § 271 against BMW AG, its vehicles or components, or its customers, importers or suppliers based on BMW AG vehicles or components; a finding under 35 U.S.C. § 285 that Defendants’ continued attempts to threaten BMW AG and enforce the patents-in-suit render the case exceptional; reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs and all interest under § 285 or any other applicable basis; and further relief. No damages are sought. BMW AG demands a jury trial on all issues triable of right by a jury (Fed. R. Civ. P. 38).

The action is pleaded to arise under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq., and the Patent Laws, 35 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.; subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1338(a) and 2201–2202, with an actual controversy pleaded because Broadcom Inc. and Avago accused BMW AG of infringing the patents-in-suit. Venue is pleaded under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 only (no § 1400(b) citation): the Court has personal jurisdiction over each Defendant and a substantial part of the events occurred in the District, including Broadcom Inc.’s regular and established place of business and Avago’s prior enforcement of patent rights in the District; Avago, as a Singapore entity, may be sued in any district under § 1391(c)(3). Pleaded facts: Broadcom’s website lists a location at 5465 Legacy Drive, Plano, Texas, posts jobs referring to “Broadcom’s office in Plano, TX”, and employees there identify as Broadcom Inc. employees. Personal jurisdiction over Avago is pleaded under due process and/or the Texas Long Arm Statute based on its record ownership of the patents-in-suit, its role as grantor of the 2020 license, its joint conduct of the licensing effort with Broadcom Inc., and its appearance as co-plaintiff in CA, Inc. and Avago Technologies International Sales Pte. Limited v. Netflix, Inc., No. 2:21-cv-00080 (E.D. Tex. 2021).

Takeda Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. (as captioned; referred to in the body as Takeda Pharmaceuticals U.S.A., Inc., "TPUSA") — pleaded as a Delaware corporation with a principal place of business at 500 Kendall Street, Cambridge, MA 02142; and Takeda Pharmaceuticals International AG ("TPIZ") — pleaded as a Swiss corporation with a principal place of business at Thurgauerstrasse 130, 8152 Glattpark-Opfikon, Zurich, Switzerland

Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP (Princeton, NJ) — Harvey Bartle (signed); of counsel (pro hac vice forthcoming): Michael J. Abernathy, Christopher J. Betti, Amanda S. Williamson, Wan-Shon Lo, Maria Doukas, Michael T. Sikora (Chicago); Julie S. Goldemberg, Margaret A. McGreal, Anna Johnson (Philadelphia); Christian D. Boettcher (Costa Mesa) — all Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP

Takeda Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. and Takeda Pharmaceuticals International AG sued Alvotech hf. in the District of New Jersey on September 1, 2026, under the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act, over AVT16, a proposed biosimilar to Takeda’s ENTYVIO (vedolizumab), a humanized IgG1 monoclonal antibody that binds the human α4β7 integrin and is approved for moderately to severely active ulcerative colitis and Crohn’s disease. The complaint pleads that TPUSA holds BLA No. 125476 (intravenous ENTYVIO, first approved May 2014) and BLA No. 761133 (subcutaneous, approved April 2024), holds the exclusive U.S. commercialization rights and "all substantial rights" to the six asserted patents, and that TPIZ is TPUSA’s exclusive licensee. It recites that Millennium Pharmaceuticals, Inc. began developing vedolizumab in the late 1990s and developed the dosing regimen, and that Takeda Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. acquired Millennium in 2008. According to the complaint, Alvotech entered into a license and development agreement and a product supply agreement with Teva Pharmaceuticals International GmbH on August 5, 2020, under which Alvotech granted Teva Switzerland exclusive commercialization rights and is to be the exclusive manufacturer and supplier of AVT16 in the United States for Teva Switzerland and its affiliates, and, on information and belief, Teva Switzerland agreed to pay a $65 million license fee plus milestone payments; Alvotech Swiss AG ran a Phase I trial (May–November 2024); a Phase III comparative study in ulcerative colitis announced in September 2024 was terminated in or about November 2025; and on June 8, 2026 Alvotech announced FDA acceptance of an aBLA for AVT16 as a proposed interchangeable biosimilar. The complaint pleads that on June 15, 2026 counsel for Alvotech USA, Inc. notified Takeda that aBLA No. 761544 had been submitted and accepted for review, but withheld the password to the application unless Takeda executed an Offer of Confidential Access with terms the complaint alleges exceed 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(1), so that Takeda has not received the aBLA or manufacturing information required by § 262(l)(2). The complaint also alleges that Alvotech announced on an earnings call plans for a "near-term launch" based on expected FDA approval in early 2027. The asserted patents, as pleaded, claim methods of treating ulcerative colitis, Crohn’s disease and inflammatory bowel disease by administering an anti-α4β7 antibody on a 300 mg intravenous schedule (initial dose, then doses at two and six weeks, with maintenance doses thereafter in several claims), some reciting clinical response or remission and low anti-drug-antibody (HAHA) outcomes.

AVT16 — vedolizumab injection for intravenous use in 300 mg single-use vials, the subject of abbreviated BLA No. 761544, which the complaint pleads was submitted by Alvotech USA, Inc. (alleged to be Alvotech hf.’s wholly owned subsidiary) and accepted for review by FDA, seeking approval as an interchangeable biosimilar to ENTYVIO (the "aBLA Product"). The factual background also refers to AVT80, described as Alvotech’s subcutaneous vedolizumab biosimilar candidate, but the counts are directed to the aBLA Product. Exhibits 7–12 (ENTYVIO label, clinical-trial records, Alvotech announcements) were not read.

Twelve counts, two per patent. The infringement counts (Counts I, III, V, VII, IX and XI, for the ’579, ’808, ’526, ’832, ’445 and ’969 patents) plead that submission of the aBLA infringes under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(C)(ii), literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. The paired declaratory-judgment counts (Counts II, IV, VI, the second count headed "Count VII" for the ’832 patent, X and XII) seek declarations that future commercial manufacture, use, sale, offer for sale and/or importation of the aBLA Product will infringe under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), (c) and/or (e), invoking 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(9)(B) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202 on the allegation that Alvotech failed to provide its aBLA within 20 days of FDA acceptance as required by § 262(l)(2). The asserted claims quoted are method-of-treatment claims; the complaint alleges that the product label will instruct the claimed use and that Alvotech will induce or contribute to direct infringement by healthcare providers and patients, with knowledge or willful blindness. Knowledge is pleaded as arising "including due to the filing of this Complaint" and, on information and belief, before filing. The complaint pleads that Alvotech hf. is a "submitter" of the aBLA, although Alvotech USA, Inc. filed it, based on Alvotech hf.’s alleged role in preparing the application and its alleged financial interest, citing In re Rosuvastatin Calcium Pat. Litig., 703 F.3d 511 (Fed. Cir. 2012), and AbbVie Inc. v. Alvotech hf, No. 21-cv-2258 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2021). No separate willfulness count and no § 287 marking allegation appear. An exceptional-case finding under § 285 is requested.

Plaintiff seeks a judgment and declaration that Alvotech has infringed or will infringe, or has induced or will induce or contribute to infringement of, one or more claims of the asserted patents through the manufacture, importation, offer for sale, sale or use of the aBLA Product before the patents expire; a permanent injunction barring Alvotech and those acting in concert with it from making, using, offering to sell, selling or distributing within, or importing into, the United States any current or future version of the aBLA Product whose use infringes; a declaration that the case is exceptional and an award of attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4) and § 285; any available damages under § 284; and other just relief. The prayer does not request enhanced damages, an accounting or a preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs demand a jury trial on all issues so triable.

Subject-matter jurisdiction is pleaded under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338(a), with the claims arising under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), (c) and (e), 42 U.S.C. § 262(l) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202. Personal jurisdiction is pleaded under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A) (citing Regeneron Pharms., Inc. v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 127 F.4th 896 (Fed. Cir. 2025), and New Jersey’s long-arm rule), alleging on information and belief that Alvotech directs sales of its SIMLANDI and SELARSDI biosimilars into New Jersey through its partnership with Teva Switzerland, that its agreements do not exclude New Jersey from commercialization of the aBLA Product, and that it intends to use the distribution channels of Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., alleged to be headquartered in the district; Rule 4(k)(2) is pleaded in the alternative. Venue is pleaded under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391 and 1400(b) on the ground that Alvotech is a foreign entity subject to suit in any district, and on allegations that it has regularly transacted business in New Jersey and will commit acts of infringement there through its intended launch.

MimirIP LLC — pleaded as a Texas limited liability company with its principal place of business at 9330 Lyndon B. Johnson Freeway, Suite 900, Dallas, TX 75243

Latham & Watkins LLP (Washington, D.C.) — Kevin C. Wheeler (designated attorney in charge, Dkt. 6), Jacob C. Vannette; Latham & Watkins LLP (Boston) — Charles H. Sanders; of counsel: Miller Fair Henry PLLC (Longview, Texas) — Andrea L. Fair, Garrett C. Parish. The signature line reads "/s/ Kevin C. Wheeler by permission Andrea L. Fair", and the block identifies all five attorneys as "Counsel for Plaintiff MimirIP LLC". Both firms therefore appear for the plaintiff; no counsel for MediaTek appears in the docket entries reviewed.

MimirIP LLC, a Dallas-based Texas LLC, sued MediaTek Inc. of Hsinchu, Taiwan, in the Marshall Division of the Eastern District of Texas on September 1, 2026, asserting four U.S. patents. The complaint pleads that Mimir owns the entire right, title and interest in each Asserted Patent, that the Asserted Patents "were the product of the research and development activities of SK hynix Inc.", and that Mimir "is the owner of the Asserted Patents by assignment"; it does not recite the assignment chain, the identity of the assignor or any assignment dates. Mimir's Rule 7.1 disclosure statement (Dkt. 2, not available in RECAP) is described in the docket text as identifying Ideahub, Inc. as Mimir's corporate parent. The complaint pleads no pre-suit notice letter, licensing discussions or prior litigation between the parties; it alleges, on information and belief, that MediaTek monitored Mimir's and/or SK hynix's patent portfolio because the two companies compete in the semiconductor device industry, and that Mimir disclosed each patent to MediaTek no later than the filing of the complaint. The ’317 patent claims a method of forming a metal line (contact hole, barrier layer, metal gap-fill stripped to form a contact plug, then a metal line); the ’954 and ’547 patents claim circuits that generate a data I/O control signal in a semiconductor memory apparatus by selecting between shorter- and longer-delay signals according to operating speed or CAS latency; the ’102 patent (claim 9) claims a semiconductor device with a silicon germanium layer in a PMOS region under the PMOS gate and an NMOS gate over the active region.

Two product groups. (1) For the ’317 and ’102 patents, the "Accused SoCs": MediaTek 3nm, 4nm, 5nm, 6nm and 7nm devices including the Dimensity 800 Series, Dimensity 900 Series, Dimensity 1000 Series, Dimensity 6000 Series, Dimensity 7000 Series, Dimensity 8000 Series, Dimensity 9000 Series, Helio G Series and Kompanio Series. The ’317 count illustrates its allegations with images of a Dimensity 6300 (6nm) removed from a Motorola G Play 2026 phone; the ’102 count uses a Dimensity 7400 (4nm) removed from a Motorola Edge 2025 phone. (2) For the ’954 and ’547 patents, "MediaTek’s DDR3 Products": the MT65xx Series, Helio X Series, Helio P Series, Helio A Series, Helio G Series, MT67xx Mid-Range Series, MT81xx Tablet Series, Kompanio Series and other products that support JEDEC DDR3-compliant memory (the MT8163V/A SoC is cited as advertised as supporting DDR3), plus LPDDR3, DDR4 and LPDDR4 Products said to work the same way, including the Helio X, P, A and G Series, Dimensity 6000, 700, 800, 900, 1000, 7000, 8000 and 9000 Series, MT81xx Tablet Series and Kompanio Series. The ’954 and ’547 theories read the claims onto the DDR3 memory controller/PHY DQS write-timing delay circuitry by reference to JEDEC standard JESD79-3F. The body also refers generally to smartphones, tablets, computers, televisions and other end-user devices containing the chips.

Four counts, one per patent (’317 claim 1; ’954 claim 1; ’547 claim 1; ’102 claim 9). Paragraph 24 cites 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), (b), (c) and (g). Each count pleads direct infringement, literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, and induced infringement. The ’317 count (a method claim) pleads direct infringement through importation, offer, sale or use in the United States of Accused SoCs manufactured abroad by the claimed method, alleging the imported SoCs are neither materially changed by subsequent processes nor trivial and nonessential components — the § 271(g) framework in substance, though the count itself cites § 271 generally. Although § 271(c) is cited and paragraph 22 refers to contributing to infringement, no count sets out the elements of contributory infringement. Inducement is pleaded with knowledge from at least the filing date. Willfulness is pleaded in every count on knowledge from at least the filing date; paragraph 26 additionally alleges, on information and belief, that MediaTek knew or should have known of each patent by its issue date through portfolio monitoring. Paragraph 27 states that Mimir "is entitled to pre-suit damages under 35 U.S.C. § 287" without pleading marking facts. Exceptional-case fees under § 285 are sought in the prayer.

Plaintiff seeks a judgment that MediaTek has infringed and continues to infringe and that the infringement has been willful; all damages, no less than a reasonable royalty, trebled under 35 U.S.C. § 284 for willful infringement, with pre-judgment and post-judgment interest and "without limitation under 35 U.S.C. § 287"; interest, costs and expenses; an accounting and/or supplemental damages for damages occurring after any discovery cutoff; a finding that the case is exceptional under § 285 with reasonable attorneys’ fees; and further just and proper relief. No injunction is requested. A jury trial is demanded on all issues so triable (also filed separately as Dkt. 3).

Subject-matter jurisdiction is pleaded under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338, with claims arising under 35 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. Personal jurisdiction is pleaded under the Due Process Clause and the Texas long-arm statute, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 17.042(2), on allegations that MediaTek transacts business in the District directly or through subsidiaries or intermediaries, places accused products into the stream of commerce, and sells through authorized sellers including Best Buy, Walmart and Amazon.com. Venue is pleaded only under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3), on the basis that MediaTek is a foreign corporation subject to personal jurisdiction in the District; § 1400(b) is not cited. The complaint alleges MediaTek has admitted or not contested personal jurisdiction and venue in this District in K.Mizra LLC v. MediaTek Inc., No. 2:26-cv-253; Freedom Patents LLC v. MediaTek, Inc., No. 4:25-cv-425; Deepwell IP LLC v. MediaTek Inc., No. 2:23-cv-429; and MOSAID Techs. Inc. v. MediaTek, Inc. et al., No. 2:23-cv-129 (all E.D. Tex.).

Viken Detection Corporation — pleaded as a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Burlington, Massachusetts

ArentFox Schiff LLP (Boston) — Christopher S. Schultz (signed), Laura L. Carroll

Viken Detection Corporation filed this single-patent suit against Videray Technologies Inc. in the District of Massachusetts on September 11, 2026, seventeen days after the asserted ’966 Patent issued. The complaint pleads that the ’966 Patent issued on August 25, 2026 from Application No. 18/475,703, filed September 27, 2023, names Peter J. Rothschild as inventor, and is assigned to Viken; that it is a continuation of Application No. 17/454,993 (U.S. Patent No. 11,776,706), itself a continuation of No. 16/935,787 (U.S. Patent No. 11,200,998), itself a continuation of No. 15/946,425 (U.S. Patent No. 10,770,195), claiming the benefit of Provisional Application No. 62/482,064 filed April 5, 2017; and that Viken owns each. As to prior dealings, the complaint alleges that Viken employed Videray’s founder as a mechanical engineer beginning on or about November 2013; that he also held an ownership interest in Viken and signed an employment agreement requiring disclosure of inventions and providing that inventions would be the company’s sole property; that his duties included developing a handheld X-ray product designed by Viken founder Peter Rothschild; that he knew of the inventions in the ’064 Provisional and was initially named as an inventor on it; that, on information and belief, he planned while still employed to leave and start a company selling a competing handheld X-ray product; that he was terminated in or around May/June of 2017; and that about two months later he formed Videray (formerly NarcRay Technologies, Inc.). The complaint further alleges that while at Viken he collected confidential Viken customer, employee and technical information, transferred it to personal cloud storage accounts, and used it to start Videray and sell the PX1. It pleads that Videray had actual and/or constructive notice of the ’195 and ’998 Patents on or before June 24, 2022 and of the ’706 Patent on or before September 19, 2023. It recites an existing action, Civil Action No. 23-cv-13035 (D. Mass.), which Videray and Tek84, Inc. commenced with a complaint for declaratory judgment of non-infringement and invalidity of the ’195, ’998 and ’706 Patents, and in which Viken counterclaimed for patent infringement, breach of contract and rescission of contract; the complaint states that discovery is complete there and that the ’966 Patent had not issued when those counterclaims were filed, and that Viken brings this separate action on the newly issued patent. It also alleges that all prior art Videray asserted against the earlier patents, including the Mini-Z, which it describes as the basis of Videray’s inequitable-conduct allegations in the existing action, was considered by the examiner before the ’966 Patent was allowed. The complaint describes the patented technology as a chopper-wheel assembly for handheld backscatter X-ray scanners that chops a fan beam into pencil beams, with a small X-ray-blocking “scatter plate” placed close to the chopper wheel (an “open geometry chopper wheel”) to confine X-rays without heavy shielding, and identifies Viken’s HBI-120, Nighthawk-HBI and Nighthawk-BTX handheld scanners as embodying the technology.

Videray’s handheld scanners called the PX1, PX Lite and PX Ultra (the “Accused Products”). The complaint alleges that Viken examined a PX1 and, on information and belief, that the PX Lite and PX Ultra include the same features; it identifies the “line collimator” of the Accused Products as the claimed plate. Exhibit A is a copy of the ’966 Patent; no claim chart is attached.

One count (infringement of the ’966 Patent), asserting at least claim 29 (an X-ray chopper wheel assembly). The complaint pleads that Videray “directly and indirectly” infringes by making, using, selling, offering for sale or importing the Accused Products, citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), literally and/or under the doctrine of equivalents, with a paragraph mapping the claim 29 elements to the Accused Products. It pleads induced infringement under § 271(b), alleging knowledge of the ’966 Patent and its family, including through the existing action, and that Videray encourages customers and end users to use the Accused Products through instructions and promotional materials. No § 271(c) count is pleaded. Willfulness is pleaded: knowledge of the patent family since at least June 24, 2022 (notice of the ’195 and ’998 Patents), further notice of the ’706 Patent on or about September 19, 2023, an allegation that Videray knew or should have known of the ’966 Patent upon its issuance on August 25, 2026, and the founder’s alleged knowledge of Viken’s chopper-wheel technology from his employment. No § 287 marking allegation is pleaded. The complaint pleads irreparable harm and entitlement to injunctive relief, lost profits and treble damages under §§ 283 and 284, and exceptional-case fees under § 285.

Plaintiff seeks a judgment that Videray has infringed the ’966 Patent; a finding of willful infringement; a preliminary and permanent injunction barring Videray, its employees, agents, officers, directors, attorneys, successors, affiliates, subsidiaries and assigns, and those in active concert with them, from infringing, contributing to the infringement of, or inducing infringement of the ’966 Patent; an accounting and damages under § 284 including at least a reasonable royalty for past and ongoing infringement, lost profits, pre- and post-judgment interest and costs; damages increased up to three times under § 284; an exceptional-case declaration and reasonable attorneys’ fees under § 285; costs of suit; and other just relief. Jury trial demanded on all claims and issues so triable.

Subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338(a). Venue is pleaded under 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) only. Pleaded facts: Videray is a Delaware corporation whose principal place of business is in Boston, within the district; on information and belief it has committed acts of infringement in Massachusetts; and, for personal jurisdiction, Videray brought the existing action in this district.

Appeal from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, No. 2:22-cv-00192-JRG, Judge J. Rodney Gilstrap. KAIFI LLC sued T-Mobile US, Inc. and T-Mobile USA, Inc. in the Eastern District of Texas on August 28, 2020, alleging infringement of the ’728 patent. T-Mobile requested ex parte reexamination (EPR) on July 13, 2021, and the Patent Office ordered it on August 19, 2021. Days before trial, the parties executed a “Settlement and Patent License Agreement” dated January 12, 2022 (governed by Texas law) under which T-Mobile received a license, made an upfront payment, and agreed to an additional “EPR Payment” “if any Asserted Claim survives the EPR”; T-Mobile also covenanted not to challenge the validity or enforceability of the licensed patents. The Patent Office then issued a Reexamination Certificate confirming asserted claims 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 11 and 20 patentable without amendment (claim 7 patentable as amended). T-Mobile did not make the EPR Payment and, citing diversity jurisdiction, sought a declaratory judgment that no asserted claim “survive[d]” the EPR, pleading causes of action based on altered claim scope, inequitable conduct during the EPR, frustration of purpose and lack of mutual assent (two fraud claims were dismissed). KAIFI counterclaimed for breach of contract. On cross-motions, the district court granted summary judgment for KAIFI on all claims, concluding the agreement is “clear and unambiguous that a claim ‘survives the EPR’ if it is confirmed as patentable in the Patent Office’s Reexamination Certificate,” and ordered T-Mobile to make the EPR Payment. The appeal was first docketed in the Fifth Circuit through a ministerial error; the Fifth Circuit granted T-Mobile’s unopposed motion to transfer without reaching appellate jurisdiction.

U.S. Patent No. 6,922,728, which the opinion describes as directed to a Wi-Fi calling technology. The settlement agreement defines the “Asserted Claims” as claims 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, 11 and 20. The opinion states the ’728 patent has been expired since January 2024.

The Federal Circuit held that it lacks appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) and transferred the case to the Fifth Circuit. Although both parties argued that jurisdiction existed (KAIFI had earlier moved to transfer for lack of jurisdiction), the court stated that it must independently assure itself of jurisdiction (Wawrzynski v. H.J. Heinz Co., 728 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). Applying Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988), and the four-part test of Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251 (2013), and treating KAIFI’s breach-of-contract counterclaim as the hypothetical well-pleaded complaint (ABB Inc. v. Cooper Industries, LLC, 635 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Jang v. Boston Scientific Corp., 767 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2014)), the court found Gunn’s first and third requirements unmet. Necessarily raised: at least one theory of relief requires no patent-law ruling (ClearPlay, Inc. v. Abecassis, 602 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2010)), because whether a claim “survives the EPR” can be resolved, as the district court did, by reading the Reexamination Certificate, which under 35 U.S.C. § 307(a) cancels or confirms claims. T-Mobile’s altered-claim-scope and inequitable-conduct theories appeared to be defenses and “not the only way” of resolving the claim (Inspired Development Group, LLC v. Inspired Products Group, LLC, 938 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Alkermes PLC, 145 F.4th 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2025)). The court distinguished Jang, where the royalty claim required resolving infringement, and Italian Cowboy Partners, Ltd. v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 341 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. 2011); noted that T-Mobile’s inequitable-conduct theory would appear to clash with its covenant not to challenge enforceability; and said T-Mobile’s extrinsic-evidence reading would effectively rewrite “Asserted Claims” as “litigated infringement claims.” It rejected KAIFI’s argument that “survives” carries a special patent-law meaning: the term does not appear in the patent statute or regulations, and the court’s own uses of it in Spectrum International, Inc. v. Sterilite Corp., 164 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998), and Pavo Solutions LLC v. Kingston Technology Co., 35 F.4th 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2022), employ the ordinary sense of the word. Substantiality: applying the factors in NeuroRepair, Inc. v. Nath Law Group, 781 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2015), the court found no dispositive pure issue of federal law; a backward-looking, fact-bound and situation-specific dispute (Gunn); no evidence that the term is used in other agreements, with future parties free to contract around it (the court’s example: “any asserted claim that is confirmed to be patentable in the reexamination proceeding”); an expired patent with no other pending litigation, which the court said makes the case materially different from Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 882 F.3d 1075 (Fed. Cir. 2018), and 916 F.3d 429 (5th Cir. 2019), notwithstanding its disagreement with the Fifth Circuit’s decision (citing Chandler v. Phoenix Services LLC, 1 F.4th 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2021)); and no direct government interest, unlike Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing, 545 U.S. 308 (2005). The court did not reach Gunn’s second and fourth requirements. Because the Eastern District of Texas had diversity jurisdiction and the Fifth Circuit would have had jurisdiction when the appeal was filed, the court transferred rather than affirming or reversing.

Appeal from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, No. 2:21-cv-00448-JRG, Judge J. Rodney Gilstrap. Constellation Designs, LLC sued LG Electronics Inc., LG Electronics USA, Inc. and LG Electronics Alabama, Inc., initially asserting willful infringement of 239 claims across seven patents against LG televisions compatible with the ATSC 3.0 over-the-air broadcast standard (protocol A/322, governing the physical layer); nine claims across four patents were asserted at summary judgment and trial. The district court granted Constellation summary judgment of patent eligibility of all asserted claims as a technical solution to a technical problem (LG did not cross-move for summary judgment of ineligibility). A jury found all asserted claims not invalid; found that LG’s accused televisions, with chips made by LG or third party Realtek Semiconductor Corp., infringed at least one asserted claim of each patent; found willfulness by clear and convincing evidence; and awarded $1,684,469.00 in past damages based on a $6.75 per-television royalty. The district court denied LG’s motions for JMOL of non-infringement and of no damages, its motion to exclude Constellation’s damages expert, and its new-trial motion, and on April 26, 2024 entered an Amended Final Judgment granting an ongoing royalty of $6.75 per television.

U.S. Patent Nos. 8,842,761 (claims 17, 21, 24 and 28), 10,693,700 (claim 5), 11,019,509 (claims 21 and 23) and 11,018,922 (claims 24 and 44), relating to communication systems that use non-uniform (geometrically shaped) symbol constellations with increased capacity compared to conventional uniform constellations. The court grouped the ’761 and ’700 claims as “optimization claims” (representative ’761 claim 17: a receiver using a QAM constellation that is “a geometrically spaced symbol constellation optimized for capacity using parallel decode capacity that provides a given capacity at a reduced signal-to-noise ratio compared to a QAM signal constellation that maximizes dmin”) and the ’509 and ’922 claims as “constellation claims” reciting specific non-uniform constellations (representative ’509 claim 21: unequally spaced point locations, each point with a different label, and at least two points sharing the same location).

Section 101 — optimization claims: the court vacated the summary judgment of eligibility and remanded. At Alice step one (Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 573 U.S. 208 (2014); Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012)), claim 17 is directed to the abstract idea of “optimizing” a constellation for parallel decode (PD) capacity: the distinguishing “wherein” clause is result-oriented and does not recite how to achieve the optimized constellation, so the claim covers every way of optimizing a constellation for PD capacity — analogous to the claim invalidated in O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853), and to ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc., 920 F.3d 759 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (also citing Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2018), and Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015), on preemption). The court relied on Constellation’s admissions and inventor testimony that non-uniform constellations, measuring PD capacity and optimizing non-uniform constellations for PD capacity were known, and held that the iterative process described in the specification cannot be imported into claims that do not recite it (Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). The court acknowledged that “the issue is close.” At step two, the asserted inventive concept is the abstract idea itself (BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2018)), and evidence of first development and of LG’s unsuccessful obviousness challenges at trial and before the PTAB conflates §§ 102 and 103 with the inventive-concept inquiry (Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Communications, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). The same result applies to ’761 claims 21, 24 and 28 and ’700 claim 5. Section 101 — constellation claims: affirmed. ’509 claim 21 is not directed to an abstract idea; it recites a concrete technological solution — specific non-uniform constellations with overlapping point locations — to the technological problem of overcoming capacity constraints to improve coding gains (cf. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Techtronic Industries Co., 935 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2019); CardioNet, LLC v. InfoBionic, Inc., 955 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2020)), so step two was not reached; ’509 claim 23 and ’922 claims 24 and 44 were not argued separately and rise or fall with it (Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. West-Ward Pharmaceuticals International Ltd., 887 F.3d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 919 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2019)). Infringement: affirmed denial of JMOL. The court agreed with the district court that Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear Inc., 620 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010), applies limitation by limitation, so a patentee may prove some limitations with standards evidence and others with product-specific evidence, provided (1) the relevant portion of the standard is sufficiently specific that practicing it would always result in practicing that limitation, and (2) that portion is mandatory or, if optional, there is evidence the accused device implements it. Substantial evidence supported the verdict (Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP America, Inc., 717 F.3d 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2013)), including testimony that the accused televisions receive ATSC 3.0 signals using the same constellations as the standard, that LG’s chips incorporate the A/322 protocol (which the FCC adopted as mandatory for ATSC 3.0 receivers), and that the Realtek-based televisions had demappers and decoders. Damages: affirmed. LG’s argument that the damages expert’s built-in-apportionment reliance on third-party Zenith licenses was unsupported is an admissibility challenge governed by Daubert, not a JMOL sufficiency question (EcoFactor, Inc. v. Google LLC, 137 F.4th 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (en banc); Versata), and the record showed technical and economic comparability sufficient to support the expert’s reliance. LG’s argument, raised for the first time at oral argument, that the damages award should be vacated if some claims are ineligible was held forfeited (ABS Global, Inc. v. Cytonome/ST, LLC, 984 F.3d 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2021)).

Appeal from the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware, No. 1:18-cv-01966-SB, Circuit Judge Stephanos Bibas (TexasLDPC Inc. v. Broadcom Inc., 2023 WL 6387974 (D. Del. Sept. 29, 2023)). Per the opinion, Dr. Kiran Gunnam developed the LDPC technology as a doctoral candidate at Texas A&M University (A&M); A&M patented it and granted Marvell International, Ltd. a non-exclusive license; Dr. Gunnam later worked at LSI Corporation and unsuccessfully tried to persuade LSI to license from A&M; and TexasLDPC was co-founded in late 2014. On June 18, 2015, A&M granted TexasLDPC an exclusive license to the patents and three copyrights in exchange for equity, a percentage of sublicense royalties and a percentage of enforcement recoveries. TexasLDPC sued Broadcom Inc. for patent and copyright infringement in December 2018 and a month later added Avago Technologies U.S. Inc. (described as Broadcom’s parent) and LSI (an Avago subsidiary), without joining A&M. Having met the Agreement’s milestones, TexasLDPC by summer 2019 had exhausted its capital, had no customers or sublicensees, and refocused solely on enforcement. Defendants’ July 2021 Rule 12(b)(7) motion for failure to join A&M was denied without prejudice; A&M later obtained an order from the Southern District of Texas quashing a 2022 subpoena on sovereign-immunity grounds. On renewed Rule 12(b)(7) and new Rule 12(b)(1) motions, the district court held that TexasLDPC had standing at filing but that the Agreement automatically terminated under § 8.03(a)(iii) when TexasLDPC “cease[d] its business operations” by shifting to enforcement, and that a nunc pro tunc agreement between A&M and TexasLDPC was ineffectual. Alternatively, it held that TexasLDPC lacked “all substantial rights” (citing the bar on suing Marvell, A&M’s exclusive right to enforce the Marvell license, and A&M’s retained development right), that A&M was a necessary party under Rule 19(a) because its sovereign immunity limited discovery relevant to a Georgia-Pacific damages analysis, and that the Rule 19(b) factors favored dismissal. It dismissed TexasLDPC’s claims and Defendants’ federal counterclaims; Defendants later voluntarily dismissed their remaining counterclaims. Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

Five patents exclusively licensed from A&M: U.S. Patent Nos. 8,418,023; 8,555,140; 9,112,530; 8,359,522; and 8,656,250, each relating to low density parity check (LDPC) code technology, a type of error correction code; the opinion quotes the ’023 patent as disclosing improvements such as “improved throughput” and “reduction . . . in message storage memory.” Three asserted copyrights cover source code programs implementing LDPC functionality. The appeal concerns license termination, standing and joinder; no specific patent claims are addressed in the opinion.

The court reversed the dismissal on all three grounds. (1) Termination: applying Texas law, under which unambiguous contract language takes its plain meaning and the contract is read as a whole (URI, Inc. v. Kleberg County, 543 S.W.3d 755 (Tex. 2018); Intellectual Tech LLC v. Zebra Technologies Corp., 101 F.4th 807 (Fed. Cir. 2024); National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. CBI Industries, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. 1995)), the court held that the Agreement unambiguously treats enforcement as one of TexasLDPC’s “business operations,” so it did not terminate in 2019. It relied on § 1.10 (defining “commercially reasonable efforts” to include expending resources to enforce the patents and copyrights), § 5.02(d) (barring termination for lack of sales or sublicensing revenue by 2021 while TexasLDPC is exercising commercially reasonable efforts to enforce or seek collections), § 2.01 (granting use, sublicensing and enforcement rights without elevating one above the others) and §§ 3.01–3.03 (consideration including a share of enforcement recoveries). The district court gave the Agreement’s broad “whereas” recitals too much weight, because recitals do not control unambiguous operative terms (Furmanite Worldwide, Inc. v. NextCorp, Ltd., 339 S.W.3d 326 (Tex. App. 2011); Country Community Timberlake Village, L.P. v. HMW Special Utility District of Harris, 438 S.W.3d 661 (Tex. App. 2014)), and Clear Lake City Water Authority v. Kirby Lake Development, Ltd., 123 S.W.3d 735 (Tex. App. 2003), was inapposite. The court did not address the nunc pro tunc agreement. (2) All substantial rights: examining the totality of the Agreement (Alfred E. Mann Foundation for Scientific Research v. Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Diamond Coating Technologies, LLC v. Hyundai Motor America, 823 F.3d 615 (Fed. Cir. 2016); University of South Florida Research Foundation, Inc. v. Fujifilm Medical Systems U.S.A., Inc., 19 F.4th 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2021)), and describing the question as “a close call,” the court held the Agreement conveyed all substantial rights, so TexasLDPC may sue in its own name. It found the grant most comparable to Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Electronics Co., 814 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2016): TexasLDPC holds the exclusive right to make, use and sell, and “the first and only right to enforce” the patents and collect past, present and future damages, which protects the accused parties from multiple suits, while A&M may initiate litigation only against Marvell and its participation in other suits is limited by consent from the Texas Attorney General. It distinguished Propat International Corp. v. Rpost, Inc., 473 F.3d 1187 (Fed. Cir. 2007), where the owner held a veto over licensing and litigation and did not convey the right to make, use or sell, and Lone Star Silicon Innovations LLC v. Nanya Technology Corp., 925 F.3d 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2019), where the licensee could sue only entities on a pre-approved list. A&M’s retained research-and-education use right is not substantial because invalidation would not endanger it; its sole right to sue the single prior licensee Marvell has limited effect and implicates only a financial interest, which without more does not require joinder; its right to approve assignment (consent “shall not be unreasonably withheld”) mirrors Luminara (see also Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc., 211 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2000)); and its milestone-based termination right no longer encumbers the license because the milestones were undisputedly met. The court declined to address Defendants’ undeveloped argument about the differing durations of the copyrights and patents (Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter International, Inc., 582 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). (3) Rule 19(a): applying Third Circuit law (Gensetix, Inc. v. Board of Regents of University of Texas System, 966 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Epsilon Energy USA, Inc. v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, 80 F.4th 223 (3d Cir. 2023)), the court held A&M is not necessary under Rule 19(a)(1)(B) for the same reasons it found a transfer of all substantial rights (Luminara, 814 F.3d at 1351 n.5; Abbott Laboratories v. Diamedix Corp., 47 F.3d 1128 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). It held that a separate Rule 19(a)(1)(A) inquiry may be required where “complete relief” is not factually tied to the rights grant, but that A&M is not necessary on that ground either: “complete relief” requires only avoiding partial or hollow relief (Sindia Expedition, Inc. v. Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, Known as The Sindia, 895 F.2d 116 (3d Cir. 1990)), and Rule 19 is not a discovery tool (Costello Publishing Co. v. Rotelle, 670 F.2d 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Johnson v. Smithsonian Institution, 189 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 1999); Hefley v. Textron, Inc., 713 F.2d 1487 (10th Cir. 1983)). The court also noted that only one Georgia-Pacific factor specifically calls for information in the licensor’s sole control, that Defendants conceded A&M had already produced the only two A&M licenses directly related to the asserted patents (the TexasLDPC Agreement and the Marvell agreement), and that Defendants’ damages expert analyzed every Georgia-Pacific factor without the additional information. The court stated there may be circumstances in which a patent owner that granted all substantial rights is a necessary party, but not where the defendants seek only discovery from it, and it did not reach the Rule 19(b) balancing.